Interview with Keir Giles, a senior consulting fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. Keir has supported the institute in its Russia-focused research since 2013. Previously, he worked with the BBC Monitoring Service and the UK Defence Academy, where he wrote and advised on Russian military, defence and security issues, including human factors influencing Russian security policy, Russian strategy and doctrine, the Russian view of cyber and information security, and Russia’s relations with its neighbours in Northern Europe.
In October 2024, he published a book called “Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent”, that lays out the stark choices facing leaders and societies as they confront the return of war in Europe. He explains how the West's unwillingness to confront Russia has nurtured the threat and that Putin's ambition puts the whole continent at risk. He assesses NATO's role and deficiencies as a guarantor of hard security and whether the EU or coalitions of the willing can fill the gap.
What's your view on the latest conflict development situation in Ukraine? How do you see it?
In the last couple of months, we have heard how Ukrainian prospects in the war have been deteriorating as a slow-motion process ever since the disastrous interruption to US aid a year ago. However, there should have been plenty of time to prepare for the expected further interruptions and possible total cut to US aid that threatens to come with Donald Trump. The fact that Trump's arrival in power again in the United States has been greeted more calmly in Ukraine than in Western Europe argues a greater understanding of what is at stake. However, that does not make the potential implications any less alarming for Ukraine and for Europe beyond it. The one startling new development is an apparent change of attitude by Trump towards Russia and, by extension, towards Ukraine. Something has influenced him to be less dependent on pleasing Moscow and to take a firmer and more robust line in dealing with Russia. If it is a genuine indication of a new policy line from Trump, this is highly encouraging, even though it remains a wild card. But Ukraine still has to deal with the legacy of the Biden administration's policy. If individuals that were constraining what Ukraine could do with the aid provided to it survive Trump's upcoming purges, there may still be an attitude of restraint in terms of what damage can be done to Russia to protect Ukraine.
Do you think that we can see some peaceful deal this year? Or is it highly unlikely?
Some kind of peace deal seems likely, but some lasting, durable, effective, workable peace deal seems less so. Something has influenced Trump, but there are still fears that the United States might use whatever leverage it has to force Ukraine into surrender. There may be growing recognition in the US, just as there is in Europe, that without effective means of deterring Russia from restarting the conflict, this would be a meaningless temporary respite for Ukraine. The question is the extent to which that can persuade the United States to arrive at a sensible and durable solution rather than forcing through something which is simply good for Trump's PR. Meanwhile, it is also clearly understood in Europe that for Ukraine, the option of a bad peace is not necessarily better than continuing to fight because the implications of agreeing to the terms that Russia has laid down for Ukraine's future are clearly understood. The extent of the disaster that they would represent, not just for Ukraine but for Ukraine's neighbours, is now accepted more broadly across Europe.
Do you think it could be a good deal, with some safety warranties for Ukraine and some perhaps painful compromises?
We have arrived now in a situation where, thanks to the hesitancy of some of Ukraine's foremost backers, the predictions of those who discounted Ukraine's chances of achieving a satisfactory outcome in this war have turned into self-fulfilling prophecies. The hesitancy has meant that the prospects for some acceptable outcome to the war have become much more distant. However, again, we should not assume that those analysts' predictions of what will happen next regarding the cessation of major combat operations for Ukraine will be any more reliable than their other forecasts. As we know from experience, that is not necessarily a guide to how the situation will develop in real life.
It seems Russia is not interested in it, right? The Kremlin has captured many territories, and they will not be interested. They will keep pushing, right? The ultimate objective is to take over four oblasts at least, right?
Well, there are many different assessments of not only Russia's objectives but also Russia's capability actually to continue the war at the current level of intensity and when the final collapse of Russian power would come as a result.
But there's no doubt that if allowed to cement its gains and to have them blessed by Western powers like the United States, Russia would see this as an opportunity in exactly the same way they have done repeatedly throughout previous decades in Georgia, Syria and in Ukraine itself under the Minsk agreement, using western powers to impose on the victims of their aggression an unworkable ceasefire, which they can breach at any time. Because once Ukraine is no longer inconveniently destroying Russian military power on land almost as quickly as Russia can rebuild it, the brakes are off, and the clock is ticking for Russia's next move.
You recently released the book Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent. In this book, you discuss that Europe should be prepared for a potential Russian attack beyond Ukraine, right?
The book is dedicated to the people of Ukraine who have paid immense costs to form the front line of the defence of Europe over a decade. But it is about that next move from Russia and where it may come, because if there is a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, then Russia will rebuild its military strength. That does not necessarily mean that its next move is going to be in Ukraine itself. If Russia is mistaken, as it was mistaken in 2022, that it is powerful enough to make its next move that could be against a NATO member state beyond Ukraine. And that is something for which Western Europe, in particular, is catastrophically underprepared.
There is a risk that Europe will have to take over most of the Western aid to Ukraine, and it cannot do so. What are your thoughts on this?
There are serious doubts over what Europe can provide in terms of military aid as opposed to financial and humanitarian aid. With a few exceptions, those European countries that have donated significant elements of military capability to Ukraine have been very poor at investing in replacing them. The will may be there, but in so many cases, the cupboard is bare. Even those countries that are fully aware that their weapon systems are being used in Ukraine for the purposes which they were first bought for, destroying Russian military capability, need to keep something for their own defence. So it is only those countries undergoing huge and transformative investments in defence, like, for example, Poland, that might be able to assist on a meaningful scale when Ukraine needs it if the United States does turn off the tap. Other countries that have been particularly active in support of Ukraine and the leadership of the coalition, like the UK, are now led by governments that have no interest in national defence and are therefore not in a position to keep up the efforts in support that they have been managing so far.
Regarding NATO, is it still possible for Ukraine to pursue membership and for NATO to incorporate Ukraine during a war?
It has always been possible for NATO to incorporate Ukraine or as much of Ukraine as remains free at the time. But it is the unwillingness of some of NATO's strongest members built on their innate hesitancy and the conviction that Russia has so successfully instilled in, for example, Washington and Berlin, that Russia is too powerful to be confronted and, for its objectives, its geopolitical objectives to be thwarted. That is the most catastrophic success of Russian information warfare and influence that has played out over the last 20 years, and it is something that puts the entire future of Europe in jeopardy.
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