Interview with Dr Jenny Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University. Jenny Mathers is currently working on several related projects that focus on different aspects of Russia's war in Ukraine, including a book that examines the crisis from the perspective of feminist security studies, a project examining the militarisation of children in Putin's Russia and research into the role of the wives and mothers of Russia's soldiers fighting in Ukraine.
What is your view on the latest conflict developments in Ukraine? Will Ukraine withstand the Russian offensive in light of manpower and weaponry shortages?
Given the necessary support from its international allies, and especially the United States, Ukraine is certainly able to withstand Russian military attacks and push them back. Ukraine's defenders have demonstrated their ability to plan and carry out bold and unexpected operations that take Russia by surprise. The Russian military does not cope well with surprises and takes time (usually several weeks at least) to adjust to the new reality on the ground, come up with a strategy for countering it and get the resources in plan to begin to put that strategy into operation. Ukraine's problem has been its inability to follow up quickly and decisively on these bold moves to make the most of the short-term confusion and disorganisation of the Russian forces, and this can largely be attributed to limitations imposed by Ukraine's allies. While the supplies of weapons, equipment, ammunition and other forms of material and financial support have been essential to Ukraine's ability to resist Russia's attacks, the slow pace, gaps in supplies and restrictions on how weapons and equipment can be used have significantly reduced their impact on the battlefield. Several of Ukraine's Western supporters, and especially the Biden administration, have been acting as though they are still in the Cold War, and they and Moscow have a common concern with getting back to a stable, "normal" relationship rather than behaving as though they are allies in a war that must be won decisively. Russia itself is facing considerable challenges in maintaining its levels of manpower (which may not be solved by importing North Korean soldiers - see the answer to question 2 below) and equipment, which have dictated the slow pace of Russia's advances in the war over the past year or so. Without a dramatic change of circumstances or the capabilities of one side or the other, the war looks set to continue to be a long and destructive conflict with no clear end in sight.
However, the prospect of a second Trump administration could introduce some dramatic changes, although whether they will benefit Ukraine is very uncertain. In the short term, the Biden administration has already indicated that it will accelerate support for Ukraine in the months that remain before Trump's inauguration in January. To have maximum impact, any additional material support would need to come with the lifting of restrictions on its use and a tightening of economic sanctions on Russia. But the most important question now is how Trump will act in relation to Russia's war in Ukraine. President Zelensky was very wise to send a message of congratulations to Trump so swiftly and to refer to the need to work together with the new US administration to achieve peace through strength. Because while Trump has shown himself to be fascinated by Putin and to crave Putin's approval, at the same time Trump is very attracted to the idea of being a strong leader on the international stage. Trump doesn't like to be bound by multilateral institutions, the need to consult with allies or indeed by agreements made by his predecessors - instead he sees himself as the ultimate deal maker. He has also indicated that he would like to get credit for bringing peace to Ukraine. And while Trump's campaign rhetoric has been deeply critical of US support for Ukraine, it is important to remember that Trump can be mercurial, so there are opportunities to influence him, especially if a certain course of action can be presented as demonstrating Trump's strong and decisive leadership and his independence of mind - in other words, he may be sensitive to the charge that he would be little more than Putin's puppet if he withdrew US support from Ukraine.
Can Russians deploying North Korean units in Ukraine to change the situation on the ground?
A great deal will depend on the quality of the North Korean troops and whether Russian commanders are able to integrate them into operations in ways that add capacity to Russia's own forces rather than create additional problems and require further resources to direct and control. Initial reports suggested that North Korea was sending highly-trained elite soldiers, which would have made sense to deploy in very targeted operations to achieve specific, high-value objectives. Ten thousand soldiers, which is the number evidently dispatched from North Korea to Russia, is a small number in comparison to the large numbers of soldiers that Russia has been sending to fight in this war, but an elite force of that number could make a difference. However, more recent reports suggest that North Korean troops are poorly trained conscripts, which paints a very different picture of what they might be able to accomplish, and also the future plans for Russian-North Korean military cooperation. Rather than importing one (or a few) relatively small, tightly-knit and well-trained groups of elite forces to carry out difficult missions, Russia may have a longer-term plan to use larger number of raw soldiers to help fill the significant gaps in the ranks of Russian soldiers left by those who have been killed and wounded. This scenario would suggest that these 10,000 North Korean soldiers could be the first, experimental group sent to pave the way for further influxes of troops in the coming months. There will certainly be significant differences of language and culture to overcome to ensure that North Korean soldiers can be integrated into Russian operations, not to mention large question marks over whether these soldiers will be as obedient to authority once they are removed from the tightly-controlled environment of North Korea, and how they will perform in combat conditions. Finally, importing soldiers from North Korea and transporting them all the way across Russia to reach a battlefield does not look like a very efficient method of troop supply.
So while Russia definitely needs the additional manpower to continue to fight this war in the way that it has chosen to do - in such a wasteful and brutal style, uncaring about human losses on its own side as well as Ukrainian losses - using North Korean soldiers does not look like a quick or easy fix and could create more problems than it solves.
What do you think about Ukraine’s victory plan presented by Zelensky?
The victory plan contains the crucial elements needed for Ukraine to break out of the current cycle of struggling to hold back Russian advances and to take advantage of its ability to launch bold operations that take the enemy by surprise. The problem Zelensky faces is persuading its international supporters of the necessity of its key provisions - especially being allowed to use weapons and equipment supplied by its allies as freely as Kyiv needs to, and being offered solid and unequivocal security guarantees in the short term.
Should Ukraine seek negotiations (e.g., on a ceasefire) with Russia in light of possible more limited Western aid in 2025?
This is, of course, a decision that has to be taken by Ukrainians. Much would depend on the terms of such an arrangement and whether Ukraine could see some short-term or longer-term benefits in it - for example, a chance to do some rebuilding and gain some much-needed rest for Ukrainian society. But Ukrainians are under no illusions that a ceasefire or even a peace agreement would provide a long term solution to Russian aggression. Russia has shown many times that it favours a strategy of stirring up trouble, 'freezing' divisions and temporary gains in place and using a frozen conflict situation as the basis for continuing to encourage division and discord to make another society less secure. Russia has also shown that it cannot be trusted to keep its word, so any agreement would likely be violated in small and large ways. In other words, any ceasefire or peace agreement that Putin might agree to would be partial and temporary.
What do you think the Kremlin’s ultimate objective in Ukraine?
The Kremlin has made its ultimate objective in Ukraine very clear - to control Ukraine, either directly by conquest and replacing Ukraine's political leadership with Moscow loyalists or indirectly by occupying portions of territory and creating obstacles in the path of Ukraine deciding for itself with whom to ally, including deterring potential alliance partners (NATO, the EU) from offering Ukraine full membership in their institutions. The Kremlin is probably far less concerned about NATO attacking Russian territory than it is about the spread of progressive ideas around social change (gender equality, LGBT rights, human rights, freedoms of speech and the media, etc.) to Russian society and seeks a cultural and ideological buffer zone as much as a territorial one. Russia's war in Ukraine is about control of ideas and of people (including those in Russia) rather than simply about Moscow wanting to add bits of territory. Once Russia's deeper interests and goals in this war are understood, it is clear that Ukraine really cannot achieve peace by giving up parcels of land.
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